More on Fixing the Banks
November 20, 2011
This week I have just a few items related to our recent topics of
the "debt/equity swap" solution for banks, and also, what banks
should look like after this crisis.
The "debt/equity swap" idea is really a variant of "Chapter 11," the
portion of our bankruptcy code that deals with organizations that
will continue operating during and after bankruptcy procedures. The
basic idea of "Chapter 11" is to reorganize the liabilities side of
the balance sheet, to redefine who owns what in the reformed going
concern.
We've been discussing these topics recently:
November
13,
2011: Recapitalizing Banks with a Debt/Equity Swap
October
24, 2011: Europe's Economic Crisis Is Not A Euro Crisis
October
23, 2011: Are TBTF Banks Unnecessary?
September
23, 2011: A Debt/Equity Swap To Recapitalize European Banks: A
Real World Example
September
1, 2011: How To Fix Europe's Problems Without Taxpayer Money
October
12, 2008: Effective Bank Recapitalization 2: Three Examples
October 5, 2008: Effective Bank Recapitalization
Here's Steen Jacobsen, Chief Economist at Saxo Bank in Denmark, who
came to the same conclusion:
Is Europe set to declare a Chapter 11 in early 2012?
Europe may need to pull a Chapter 11
– a US-style bankruptcy, which would permit a market shutdown and
Euro Zone reorganization before reopening for business. ...
So what form might a Chapter 11 for the Euro Zone take? It is
increasingly likely that some kind of total “bank holiday” is
enforced to put a stop to market pressures – and then to reinforce
and relaunch a stricter EU Growth and Stability Pact as a price
for cranking up the ECB printing presses to full speed.
Before accusing me of lunacy on my idea of a market holiday, it’s
important to point out that banking holidays are not without
precedent. In 1933, President Roosevelt declared a bank holiday
that ran for an entire week in March of 1933, during which he
passed the Emergency Banking Act and the Federal Reserve moved to
supply currency to banks. ...
Here's an extended item from John Hussman of Hussman Funds, who
outlines bank debt restructuring and some of the political
implications.
Recession,
Restructuring, and the Ring Fence
We are headed toward a new recession
because our policy makers never addressed the underlying problem
in the first place, which was, and remains, the need for debt
restructuring. This is an issue that I suspect will re-emerge to
the forefront of public debate in the next year. Hopefully, the
response of our policymakers will be at different.
Think of restructuring this way. U.S. stocks just lost $2.5
trillion last quarter. Why should the public bail out the
bondholders of financial institutions when the assets of these
companies are far beyond what is needed to cover their liabilities
to depositors and customers? The problem for banks, of course, is
that they are leveraged, so even a drop of a few percent in their
assets wipes out much of their own capital and threatens to make
them insolvent. That should be a major concern for the lenders who
have allowed the managements of those banks to leverage their bets
with increasing lack of transparency (thanks to the FASB). But
"failing" institutions can be restructured without any loss to
depositors or counterparties. When banks become insolvent, my view
is that receivership and restructuring is exactly what should
happen, and swiftly.
Look at Bank of America's balance sheet, for example. Reported
assets are $2.261 trillion. Against that, liabilities to
depositors amount to less than half that, at $1.038 trillion. Add
in $239 billion for securities that they are obligated to
repurchase, $129 billion in trading account and derivative
liabilities, and $155 billion for accrued expenses. Now you've
covered counterparties, as well as vendors or others who might
have invoices outstanding. Even then, and you're still only up to
$1.561 trillion of the liabilities. The remaining 31% of Bank of
America's liabilities represent obligations to its own bondholders
and equity of its own shareholders. This is well beyond what is
sufficient to buffer any loss that the company might take on its
assets, while still leaving customers and counterparties
completely whole. To say that Bank of America can't be allowed to
"fail" is really simply to say that Bank of America's bondholders
can't be allowed to experience a loss.
What "failure" really means is that bondholders lose money, and
the operating part of the institution is taken into receivership,
sold for the difference between assets and non-bondholder
liabilities, and recapitalized under different ownership. Often
the only thing that customers and depositors notice is that there
is a new logo on top of their statements.
Now take a look at Citigroup's balance sheet. Reported assets are
$1.956 trillion. Against that, liabilities to depositors again
amount to less than half of that, at $866 billion. Add in $204
billion in repurchase obligations, $209 billion in trading and
brokerage liabilities, and $73 billion in other liabilities, and
you're still only up to $1.352 trillion. The remaining 31% of
Citigroup's liabilities, again, represent obligations to its own
bondholders and equity of its own shareholders. And again, to say
that Citigroup can't be allowed to "fail" is really simply to say
that Citigroup's bondholders can't be allowed to experience a
loss.
You can do the same calculations for nearly every major financial
institution in the world. The amount of bondholders and equity
coverage varies somewhat, but in virtually every case, bondholder
and shareholder capital of these institutions are more than
sufficient to absorb any losses without the need for public funds,
provided that the objective of government policy is to protect the
people and the long-term viability of the economy, rather than
defending the existing owners, bondholders, and managements of
these institutions. Make no mistake - that choice is what the
oncoming crisis is going to be about (See An Imminent Downturn -
Whom Will Our Leaders Defend? ).
But who are those bondholders? They include corporate investors,
pension funds, endowments, mutual funds and ordinary investors.
And all of them willingly take a risk in order to reach for
return. As do stock market investors. And if the risk doesn't work
out, none of them should look to the government to fire teachers,
lay off social workers, underfund the National Institutes of
Health, cut Medicaid, and print money (because until the Fed sells
its Treasury and GSE holdings, it has indeed printed money), just
because they take their risk in a different type of security.
My impression is that the scare-mongering of self-serving
financial "experts" on Wall Street is shortly about to become
deafening. It would be catastrophe, utter catastrophe, no,
Armageddon, to let the global financial system collapse -
collapse! - because the world as we know it will indeed collapse,
as day follows night, if bondholders, who knowingly and
voluntarily take risk and invest at a spread, are actually allowed
to lose anything! We cannot, in a thinking society, allow losses
to befall risk-takers who make reckless loans and bad investments.
We must, must at all costs, divert money away from health,
education, and welfare, in order to save these companies from
failure, because neither health, nor education, nor welfare are
even possible unless we save the financial system from unthinkable
meltdown. We have no choice. No choice at all. They are too big to
fail, and we cannot hesitate - they must be saved, for the sake of
our children, for our children's children, for our freedom, for
the flag, and to honor the legacy of our forefathers, so that
these Champions of Disfigured Capitalism can continue to do their
vital work with impunity, unbound by any of the incentives or
consequences that actually allow capitalism to work in practice.
To reiterate the observations of Sheila Bair, the outgoing head of
the FDIC, in her discussion of the 2008-2009 crisis (see Sheila
Bair's Exit Interview ): "'We were rarely consulted. They would
bring me in after they'd made their decision on what needed to be
done, and without giving me any information they would say, ‘You
have to do this or the system will go down.' If I heard that once,
I heard it a thousand times. ‘Citi is systemic, you have to do
this.' No analysis, no meaningful discussion. It was very
frustrating.' ... As she thinks back on it, Bair views her
disagreements with her fellow regulators as a kind of high-stakes
philosophical debate about the role of bondholders. Her
perspective is that bondholders should take losses when an
institution fails. When the F.D.I.C. shuts down a failing bank,
the unsecured bondholders always absorb some of the losses. That
is the essence of market discipline: if shareholders and
bondholders know they are on the hook, they are far more likely to
keep a close watch on management's risk-taking."
I feel it is important to emphasize - as we move toward recession
- that we shouldn't blame what is happening here on capitalism or
free markets. We really have only a caricature of those here. We
have a system that is constantly eager to abandon the proper role
of government in the markets - which is effective regulation of
risk - and to substitute it with the worst role of government in
the markets - which is absorbing losses for those whose losses
should not be absorbed, and pursuing policies tilted toward the
constant creation of speculative bubbles and the avoidance of
required economic adjustments, rather than the productive
allocation of capital.
Free markets work - provided that they operate within a framework
of government policy that enforces property rights, provides
reasonable regulation, coordinates objectives that cannot be
achieved privately (e.g. certain infrastructure, insurance
coverage for pre-existing conditions - which otherwise creates an
adverse selection problem even for companies that would like to
offer it), and maintains reasonable consumer protection (because
there is a huge "information problem" in requiring each consumer
to have all of the requisite facts to avoid abusive practices). To
blame our economic problems on the free market is an insult to
what has proved for centuries to be the most effective economic
system for creating prosperity and raising living standards. We
would be wise to stomp out the incessant policy of bailouts and
monetary distortions if we hope for that to continue.
Here's banking specialist Chris Whalen of Institutional Risk
Analytics, explaining the process of "converting debt to equity."
http://blogs.reuters.com/christopher-whalen/2011/08/09/uncertainty-and-indecision-threaten-bank-america-and-global-markets/
BAC is a too big to fail zombie
created by the Obama Administration and the Fed to protect US
financial markets, but is now so vast and unstable that it
threatens the global economy. But more corrosive and dangerous
than the torrents of red ink inside BAC is the steady erosion of
public confidence. Uncertainty is the enemy now, both with respect
to BAC and to its large bank peers.
The only way to end the uncertainty and also accelerate the
economic recovery is to put BAC through a restructuring using the
powers under the Dodd-Frank legislation. While a restructuring by
the FDIC may seem to be a horrible prospect, in fact it offers the
first real hope of definiteness in the housing crisis, the
multi-trillion dollar millstone around our collective necks.
Indeed, the BAC situation illustrates why the Founders of the US
embedded bankruptcy in the Constitution, namely the need for
finality.
In mechanical terms, here is how it works. Let’s start the
narrative with a last, Hail Mary move by BAC CEO Brian Moynihan,
who put the shell corporation that is the legal successor to the
Countrywide business into bankruptcy after settlement efforts
fail. This engraved message from Moynihan to BAC’s creditors,
litigants and even Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner — “foxtrot
oscar” — begins the real endgame.
Hopefully Secretary Geithner will know about the BAC filing before
it occurs and will have begun the process under Dodd-Frank to give
regulators and especially the FDIC the power to move immediately
to protect BAC and its subsidiary banks. In our narrative, FDIC
enters the bankruptcy litigation for Countrywide and asserts
control of the entire BAC group. BAC becomes effectively a
subsidiary of the FDIC, with the full capital and assets of the
entire industry behind it.
Once the FDIC is in control of BAC, the process will then proceed
like a typical bankruptcy, with the operating units continuing to
do business in the normal course. For consumers and business
customers, the situation at BAC will be mostly the same. But for
investors and especially creditors, the situation will be far from
normal.
In a Dodd-Frank resolution, the creditors of BAC will have an
opportunity to file claims, much as with any failed bank. Unlike a
bankruptcy, however, the FDIC will make all depositors of the
subsidiary banks whole before considering claims of creditors of
the parent, a significant difference investors ought to consider.
Most important, however, will be the process of converting debt to
equity in the restructured BAC, providing the resources to absorb
losses, fund continuing operations and restructure.
The beauty of a restructuring is that it forces all parties with a
claim on the failed company to speak now or forever hold their
peace. It also requires the conversion of debt to equity, which
increases capital dramatically and also lowers the operating
expenses of the enterprise. A super-capitalized BAC with 2-3%
asset returns, 30% tangible equity and gobs of cash flow will then
be ready to sell assets, modify mortgages and do whatever it takes
to restore the ability of the bank to support new leverage. That
is why restructuring is the key to US economic revival.
Here's Chris Whalen again (on video), explaining that "all major
U.S. banks will require restructuring, government receivership." In
other words, Chapter 11 and a debt/equity swap.
http://dailybail.com/home/chris-whalen-bank-bailouts-20-is-coming-all-major-us-banks-w.html
Finally, on our topic of what the financial system should look like
afterwards (much smaller and simpler, resembling 1960s banking with
computers), here's Boston University professor Laurence Kotlikoff.
He calls it "limited purpose banking."
“Larry Kotlikoff grabs us by the
collar, brilliantly unveiling the truth about our financial
system: ‘It’s a system virtually designed for hucksters.’ With
scintillating arguments, vivid examples, and terrific wit, he
shows us a path of powerful reform that would stop banks from
gambling and restrict them to their legitimate purpose,
‘connecting borrowers to lenders and savers to investors.’ This is
economics at its very best: deeply insightful and powerfully
useful. It will change the global debate.”
-- Jeffrey Sachs, Director of The Earth Institute, Quetelet
Professor of Sustainable Development, and Professor of Health
Policy and Management at Columbia University
http://kotlikoff.net/